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In this paper, we define a probabilistic version of filtration and use it to provide a finite
approximation of Markov processes. In order to measure the approximation, we employ
probability logic to construct the final Markov process and define a metric on the set of
Markov processes through this logic. Moreover, we show that the set endowed with this
metric is a Polish space. Finally we point to some questions connecting approximation to
uniformity and approximate bisimilarity as topics for future research.
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1. Introduction
Markov processeswith continuous state spaces are importantmathematicalmodels in different physical sciences such as
physics, biology, finance and computer sciences. With the ever-growing computer technology, we need to develop a theory
of computational grip of this kind of important structures. If one is interested in computing them, one has to first discretize
them. In order to achieve this goal, we must build a machinery to approximate Markov processes with continuous state
spaces by discrete ones and also make sure that the approximating processes preserve all the essential properties especially
the dynamic aspects of the original processes. The dynamics of the process is governed by the present state rather than by
the past history of the process.
How does one know that the discretized process is a faithful approximation of the underlying continuous one? In other
words, we should provide a notion of equivalence between continuous systems and discrete ones. Probabilistic bisimulation
is central to study this kind of equivalence. Intuitively, twoprobabilistic bisimilar processesmatch transition probabilities for
the same moves. Not only does probabilistic bisimulation enjoy some fundamental mathematical properties, most notably
its characterization as a fixed point, but also it has a substantial logical meaning. Two processes are logically equivalent if
they satisfy the same set of formulas whose syntax is specified as follows:
ϕ := ⊤ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | Lrϕ(r ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q )
where Q is the field of rationals. The formula Lrϕ says that the probability that the event ϕ will happen is at least r . One of
the most important results for probabilistic bisimulation is the following Hennessy–Milner property.
Two processes are probabilistic bisimilar iff they are logically equivalent.
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This property holds both for all discrete Markov processes [14] and for Markov processes with continuous state space
with natural topological assumptions such as being Polish and analytical [14,20]. So the logic with the above syntax is also
called a Hennessy–Milner logic for probabilistic bisimilarity. We can simply say that this logic characterizes probabilistic
bisimilarity.
The Hennessy–Milner property can also be discretized. In process algebra [35], n-bisimilarity is defined and is shown to
correspond to logical equivalence up to depth n. It is generalized to analyze transition systems with continuous state space
in qualitative modal logic [8].1 In some sense, this correspondence is a discretized form of the Hennessy–Milner property.
Similarly this discretized form also holds for quantitative modal logics or simply probability logics. But we need to consider
onemore and the crucial factor in the discretization procedure: quantitative indices in probability formulas,which alsomakes
our reasoning in probability logic much more involved than in qualitative modal logic. The natural method to incorporate
this factor is to restrict all indices of the formulas that we consider to a finite set of rationals which are all multiples of 1/q
for some natural number q.
In parallel, there is another closely-related discretization called filtration. In qualitativemodal logic , given a Kripkemodel
M and a finite setΓ ofmodal formulas, a filtration identifies states that satisfy the same subset of formulas inΓ and collapses
the original model to a finite state one which preserves the satisfiability of formulas in Γ . Filtration for probability logics
is quite similar. We only need to consider one more factor: probability indices and adapt the same approach as above for
discretized Hennessy–Milner property.
The above-described discretizations are the main motivation of our approximation of Markov processes through
filtration. The main contributions of the present paper about filtration are
• If a formula is satisfiable in a Markov process, it is also satisfied in a finite Markov process in the sense that it has only
finitely many states and all its transition probabilities are multiples of 1/q for some natural number q.
• Given all finite approximants of a Markov process, we can reconstruct the dynamic aspects of the original one.
In order to capture precisely the approximation, we need a metric2 to measure the difference between any two different
Markov processes. Our metric is based on the smallest formula that distinguishes them. If the formula is very complicated,
then a long sequence of observations are needed to tear them apart. So we believe that these two processes are very far
away from each other. This metric takes two factors into account. The first one is the difference of transition probabilities of
events. The second one is a discount factor c . This c will give more weight to the probability differences that arise earlier in
the evolution of the process.
In the literature, Desharnais et al. [16] took a similar approach to ours. But they used functional expressions from [34]
instead of probability formulas as building blocks to define a metric. So their machinery seems quite different from the
Hennessy–Milner logic for probabilistic bisimilarity. In contrast, our approach to define the metric on Markov processes
through formulas is in keeping with this logic. More importantly, we can easily show that the space of Markov processes
with our metric is a Polish space.
van Breugel and Worrell [40] also defined a metric on probabilistic transition systems through the final coalgebra of a
functor based on a metric on the space of Borel probability measures on a metric space. The existence of the final coalgebra
requires ametric space because of Banach’s fixed point theorem. They showed that Desharnais’smetric defined by functional
expressions and their metric through the final coalgebra are equivalent.
Our definition of metric is purely logical and will combine these two approaches into a uniform framework through
probability logic. Not only are probability formulas employed to define ametric onMarkov processes, but also they are used
to construct the final Markov process. Our main contributions in this aspect are:
• a new definition of metric through probability formulas which also takes into account the discount factor;
• The space of Markov processes with this metric is shown to be a Polish space.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will provide the background in Markov processes and probability logic,
and construct the final Markov process out of maximally consistent set of formulas. We will elaborate filtration and
approximation in Section 3. In Section 4, we define a new metric and show that the space of Markov processes endowed
with this metric is a Polish space. The last section will point to some questions that we are going to address in the near
future.
2. Markov processes and probability logic
In this section, we will present Markov processes in the coalgebraic setting and employ probability logic to construct a
finalMarkov process.
1 In this paper, qualitative modal logic refers to those with possible world semantics whereas probabilistic modal logic or simply probability logic stands
for those with probabilistic transition semantics.
2 Metrics in this paper are actually pseudometrics.
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2.1. Preliminaries on measurable spaces and category theory
LetA be a (Boolean) algebra on a set X , i.e. a non-empty collection of subsets of X closed under complements and binary
unions. A is a σ -algebra if it is also closed under countable unions. A π-system is a class of subsets of X closed under the
formation of finite intersections. IfA is a σ -algebra, thenX = ⟨X,A⟩ is ameasurable space and the elements ofA are usually
called events ormeasurable subsets of X . Wewrite σ(A0) for the smallest σ -algebra containing a given setA0 of subsets ofA.
When σ(A0) = A, we usually say thatA0 generatesA. Ameasurable function f : ⟨X,A⟩ → ⟨X ′,A′⟩ is a function f : X → X ′
such that, for any A′ ∈ A′, f −1(A′) ∈ A where ⟨X ′,A′⟩ is also a measurable space. A set function µ : A→ [0,∞] onA in
X is finitely additive if µ(A1 ∪ A2) = µ(A1)+ µ(A2)whenever A1 and A2 are disjoint elements ofA. µ is called a (countably
additive)measure if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. µ(∅) = 0;
2. µ(
∞
i=1 Ai) =
∞
i=1 µ(Ai)where {Ai}∞i=1 is a pairwise disjoint sequence of events ofA.
The second property is usually called the countable additivity. The measureµ is finite or infinite asµ(X) <∞ orµ(X) = ∞.
If µ(X) ≤ 1, then µ is called a subprobability measure. If µ(X) = 1, then µ is called a probability measure. A metric space
⟨X, ρ⟩ is complete if any Cauchy sequence has a limit in X , and ρ is called a complete metric. A topological space ⟨X, τ ⟩ is
called separable if it has a countable dense subset. A Polish space ⟨X, τ ⟩ is a separable topological space which is metrizable
through a complete metric. The Borel σ -algebra B(X, τ ) for the topology τ is the smallest σ -algebra that contains τ . An
analytical space is the image of a Polish space under a continuous function from one Polish space to another. The following
three theorems are useful for our further results. The interested reader can find their proofs and more details in [7,28].
Theorem 2.1. LetA be an algebra,
1. Any measure µ on A is continuous from above, meaning that if {An : n ∈ N} ⊆ A is a non-increasing sequence whose
intersection belongs toA, with at least one An having finite measure, then µ(

n∈N An) = limn→∞ µ(An).
2. Letµ : A→ [0,∞] be finitely additive withµ(X) <∞. Thenµ is a measure if it is continuous at ∅, i.e., limn→∞ µ(An) = 0
for any non-increasing sequence {An : n ∈ N} withn An = ∅.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose thatµ1 andµ2 are finite measures on σ(A), whereA is aπ-system and σ(A) is the σ -algebra generated
byA. If µ1 and µ2 agree onA, then they agree on σ(A).
Theorem 2.3. Let f : (X,AX )→ (Y ,AY ) be a function between measurable spaces, and C generateAY . Then f is measurable
iff f −1(C) ∈ AX for each C ∈ C.
For any measurable spaceX, we obtain a measurable space ∆(X) of all probability measures onX with the σ -algebra
A∆ generated by the sets {βr(A) : r ∈ [0, 1], A ∈ A}, where βr(A) = {µ ∈ ∆(X) : µ(A) ≥ r)}. If f : ⟨X,A⟩ → ⟨X ′,A′⟩ is
measurable,∆(f ) is defined to be a function from∆(X) to∆(X′)with the following property:
for any µ ∈ ∆(X), A′ ∈ A′,∆(f )(µ)(A′) = µ(f −1(A′)).
Theorem 2.4 (Giry [25]). ∆(f ) is measurable.
This theorem is the essential technical measure-theoretical result in this paper. The categoryMeas has the measurable
spaces as objects and the measurable functions as morphisms, with the usual functional composition of morphisms.
Let C and D be categories. A functor F from C to D is a mapping that
• associates to each object X ∈ C an object F(X) ∈ D ,
• associates to eachmorphism f : X → Y ∈ C amorphism F(f ) : F(X)→ F(Y ) ∈ D such that the following two conditions
hold:
1. F(idX ) = idF(X) for every object X ∈ C;
2. F(g ◦ f ) = F(g) ◦ F(f ) for all morphisms f : X → Y and g : Y → Z .
That is, functors must preserve identity morphisms and composition of morphisms.
A functor from a category to itself is called an endofunctor. The above defined∆ is an endofunctor onMeas and is actually
the well-known Giry functor [25].
The functor C → D which maps every object of C to a fixed object X in D and every morphism in C to the identity
morphism on X is called a constant or selection functor. The identity functor on X is the functor that maps every object and
morphism to themselves. The Cartesian product X1 × X2 of two sets has associated projections πj : X1 × X2 → Xj for
j ∈ {1, 2}. The coproduct X1 + X2 of X1 and X2 is their disjoint union, with injective insertion function inj : Xj → X1 + X2
for j ∈ {1, 2}. Each element of X1 + X2 is equal to inj(x) for a unique j and a unique x ∈ Xj. Sometimes we use inl and inr for
in1 and in2, respectively. Also these constructions lift to measurable spaces. The σ -algebra of the product space X1 × X2 is
generated by the products A1 × A2 of measurable sets Aj from each factor Xj, or equivalently by the inverse image π−1j (Aj)
of the measurable sets from each factor. The σ -algebra of the co-product space X1 + X2 is generated by the insertion inj(Aj)
of the measurable sets Aj from each summand Xj. Note that all the associated projections, insertions are all measurable
functions.
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Two measurable functions f1 : X1 → X ′1 and f2 : X2 → X ′2 have a measurable product f1 × f2 : X1 × X2 → X ′1 × X ′2 and a
measurable co-product f1 + f2 : X1 + X2 → X ′1 + X ′2, where
• (f1 × f2)(x1, x2) = (f1(x1), f2(x2));
• (f1 + f2)(inj(xj)) = inj(fj(xj)).
The product T1 × T2 of two functors on Meas is the functor that acts on the space by X → T1X × T2X , and on morphisms
by f → T1(f )× T2(f ). The co-product functor T1 + T2 has X → T1X + T2X and f → T1(f )+ T2(f ). 1 is the terminal object
functor. This functor maps each object to the terminal object 1 inMeas which is the singleton space. The interested reader
may consult [2] for the basics about category theory and [7] for measure theory.
The class ofmeasurable polynomial functors is the smallest class of functors onMeas containing the identity functor Id, the
constant functorM for each measurable spaceM , and closed in the following ways: if U and V are measurable polynomials,
then so are U + V ,U × V and∆U . Our main results in this paper concerns the functor∆(Id+ 1).
Let T : C → C be an endofunctor on the category C; then a coalgebra for T is a pair (A, f ) consisting of an object A ∈ C
and a T -morphism f : A → TA. A coalgebra morphism h from a coalgebra (X, f ) to another coalgebra (X ′, f ′) is a T -morphism
X to X ′ such that f ′ ◦ h = T (h) ◦ f , that is to say that the following diagram commutes:
X
f

h / X ′
f ′

T (X)
T (h)
/ T (X ′)
In particular, each ∆-morphism is a measurable function. A coalgebra (A, f ) is final if for every coalgebra (B, g) there is
exactly one coalgebra morphism from (B, g) to (A, f ). In theoretical computer science, the existence of final coalgebras
is usually closely related to the semantics of recursive types [32]. In game theoretical economics, the existence of final
coalgebras also proved the equivalence of implicit and explicit descriptions of belief types [30]. In some sense, we try to unify
in this paper the perspectives from such different fields as game theoretical economics, coalgebra andMarkov processes into
a uniform framework through probability logic. The interested reader may refer to [37] for the theory of coalgebras and to
[4] for game theoretical economics.
2.2. Markov processes and their logical characterization
Definition 2.5. A transition (sub)probability function T on a measurable spaceX = ⟨X,A⟩ is a function from X ×A to [0, 1]
satisfying the following two conditions:
• for each x ∈ X , T (x, ·) is a (sub)probability measure, and
• for each A ∈ A, T (·, A) is a measurable function. ▹
Definition 2.6. A Markov process M is a structure ⟨X, i,A, T ⟩, where ⟨X,A⟩ is measurable space, i is the initial state3 in X ,
and T is a subprobability transition function. ▹
We will not consider the initial state until Section 4. In this case, we simply writeM as ⟨X,A, T ⟩.
Proposition 2.7. Markov processes are coalgebras of the sub-probability measure functor S(X) = ∆(X + 1).
Let t be ameasurable function fromX = ⟨X,A⟩ to∆(X) = ⟨∆(X),A∆⟩. Define Tt : X×A→ [0, 1] as Tt(x, A) = t(x)(A).
It is easy to check that Tt is a transition probability function. Conversely, if T is a transition probability function, the function
tT : X → ∆(X) defined below is measurable [44,45]:
tT (x)(A) := T (x, A) for each x ∈ X, A ∈ A.
So a Markov process M = ⟨X,A, T ⟩ with a transition probability function T is a coalgebra (X, tT ) of ∆. In game theoretical
economics, a transition probability function is called a type function [30]. Generally, a Markov processM = ⟨X,A, T ⟩ is the
coalgebra (X, tT ) of the functor S(X) = ∆(X + 1)where, for each x ∈ X and A ∈ A, tT (x)(inl(A)) = T (x)(A).
Our following definitions of zigzagmorphism (from [14]) and of a finalMarkov process just paraphrase the above notions
of coalgebra morphism and of a final coalgebra, respectively.
Definition 2.8. A function f : ⟨X,A, T ⟩ → ⟨X ′,A′, T ′⟩ is a zigzag morphism if it is measurable, and the following equality
holds:
T (x, f −1(A′)) = T ′(f (x), A′), for any x ∈ X, A′ ∈ A′. ▹
3 In the definition of metric on Markov processes in Section 4, we need the initial states.
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Definition 2.9. A Markov process M = ⟨X,A, T ⟩ is final if, for every Markov process M ′ = ⟨X ′,A′, T ′⟩, there is a unique
zigzag morphism fromM ′ toM . ▹
Definition 2.10. The two Markov processes ⟨X,A, T ⟩ and ⟨X,A′, T ′⟩ are probabilistically bisimilar or simply bisimilar if
there is a Markov process ⟨X ′′,A′′, T ′′⟩with two surjective zigzag morphisms h′ : X ′′ → X ′, and h : X ′′ → X . ▹
Let ⟨X, f ⟩ and ⟨X ′, f ′⟩ be two Markov processes, considered as coalgebras. They are probabilistically bisimilar (or simply
bisimilar) if there exists a third coalgebra ⟨X ′′, f ′′⟩with two surjective coalgebra morphisms h and h′ such that the following
diagram commutes:
X
f

o h X ′′
f ′′

h′ / X ′
f ′

∆(X + 1) o
∆(h+1) ∆(X
′′ + 1)
∆(h′+1)
/ ∆(X ′ + 1)
One important result about Markov processes is that there is a Hennessy–Milner logic to characterize the above
probabilistic bisimulation. A formula ϕ of the logic is formed by the following syntax:
ϕ := ⊤ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | Lrϕ(r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1])
where Q is the field of rationals. L0 denotes the language of this simple syntax and L+0 is L0 without negation. It is well-
known [14] thatL+0 is rich enough to provide the Hennessy–Milner property for probabilistic bisimulation. However, since
a deductive system for probability logic plays an important role in this paper, we choose to keep negation to get a standard
completeness result.
Lemma 2.11. For a fixed Markov process M = ⟨S,A, T ⟩, there exists a unique satisfaction relation |= between the state w of
M and modal formulas ϕ in L0 that satisfies the following clauses; moreover, the associated interpretation [[ϕ]]M = {w ∈ S :
M, w |= ϕ} is a measurable set, for all formulas ϕ.
• M, w |= ⊤ for allw ∈ S;
• M, w |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, w |= ϕ1 and M, w |= ϕ2;
• M, w |= ¬ϕ iff M, w |̸= ϕ;
• M, w |= Lrϕ iff T (w)([[ϕ]]M) ≥ r, where [[ϕ]]M := {w ∈ S : M, w |= ϕ}.
Proof. The two statements in the lemma can be proved simultaneously, by mutual recursion on the complexity of formulas
ϕ. The crucial step is based on the fact that the definition of T guarantees that [[ϕ]]M ∈ A for all formulas ϕ, especially, if
[[ϕ]]M ∈ A, then [[Lrϕ]]M = (T (·, [[ϕ]]M))−1([r, 1]), which is measurable according to the definition of T . 
A formula ϕ is valid in the Markov process M if M |= ϕ, i.e. for all states w ∈ S, M, w |= ϕ. It is valid in a class of Markov
processes C if, for each M ∈ C, M |= ϕ. Let Γ be a set of formulas and ϕ a formula. Γ is satisfied at a state w of M if all
formulas in Γ are satisfied atw, which is denotedM, w |= Γ . And Γ |= ϕ means
for anyw ∈ M in any Markov processM ,M, w |= Γ impliesM, w |= ϕ.
A satisfied theory at a state x of a Markov process is the set of all formulas in L0 that are satisfied at this state. In the
following sections, we will construct a final Markov process by these satisfied theories. First let Ω denote the set of all
satisfied theories. The description map d from a Markov process M ′ = ⟨Ω ′,A′, T ′⟩ to Ω is defined as follows: for each
w′ ∈ Ω ′, d(w′) = {ϕ ∈ L0 : M ′, w′ |= ϕ}. Note that, since the association of d toM ′ is inessential, we simply omitM ′ from
the supposed subscript. The following 2 lemmas are needed to show Theorem 2.17. We put the proofs of these two lemmas
in the Appendix.
Lemma 2.12. Let M1 = ⟨Ω1,A1, T1⟩ and M2 = ⟨Ω2,A2, T2⟩ be Markov processes. If f : M1 → M2 is a zigzag morphism, then,
for any formula ϕ, f −1([[ϕ]]M2) = [[ϕ]]M1 , where [[ϕ]]M1 = {w ∈ Ω1 : M1, w |= ϕ} and [[ϕ]]M2 = {w ∈ Ω2 : M2, w |= ϕ}.
Lemma 2.13. Let M1 = ⟨Ω1,A1, T1⟩ and M2 = ⟨Ω2,A2, T2⟩ be Markov processes. If f : M1 → M2 is a zigzag morphism, then,
f preserves the satisfiability of formulas, i.e., for anyw ∈ Ω1, d(w1) = d(f (w1)), where d is the above description map.
The following is the well-known theorem about the Hennessy–Milner property or expressivity of Markov processes
[14,22].
Theorem 2.14. Let ⟨Ω1,A1, T1⟩ and ⟨Ω2,A2, T2⟩ be two Markov processes whose Ωi’s (i = 1, 2) are Polish spaces and Ai’s
(i = 1, 2) are Borel σ -algebra. They are bisimilar iff they satisfy the same set of formulas ofL0 orL+0 .
80 C. Zhou, M. Ying / Theoretical Computer Science 446 (2012) 75–97
Remark 2.15. In qualitative modal logic [8], bisimilarity implies modal equivalence. In other words, if two states are
bisimilar, then they satisfy the same set of formulas. Although the converse holds for finite state systems [31], it does not
for infinite state ones. The eminent counterexample is as follows:
✛ ✟✟✙✟✟✙
 
 ✠
 ✠
 ✠
· · ·
w ✛ ✟✟✙✟✟✙
 
 ✠
 ✠
 ✠
· · ·
w′
❄...
It is easy to check thatw andw′ satisfies the same set of modal formulas but they are not bisimilar [8].
The above theorem is just the counterpart of the Hennessy–Milner theorem in qualitative modal logic. The connection
between syntactic equivalence and probabilistic bisimulation is explored in detail in the monograph [23]. In order to secure
the Hennessy–Milner property, we must impose some topological conditions on Markov processes such as above being
Polish or being analytical [14]. However, there is behavioral equivalence studied in [11,33,18,38] for which one need not
impose anything.
2.3. Probability logic and final coalgebra
In this section, we will develop a deductive system to characterize the semantic consequence relation |=. Our deductive
system is not about theoremhood but about the deducibility relation Γ ⊢ ϕ, from sets of formulas to formulas, what is
intended to capture the idea that ϕ is deducible from members of Γ with aid of various axioms and rules of inference. The
definition of ⊢ is to be syntactic, depending only on the symbolic pattern of formulas and basic set-theoretic properties of
sets of them. We attempt to show that ⊢ is identical to the above semantically defined consequence relation |=, thereby
characterizing |= proof-theoretically. Without further notice, all rationals below are between 0 and 1 inclusively.
Probability Logic
Axioms:
• (A0) propositional calculus
• (A1) L0ϕ
• (A2)¬Lr⊥, for 0 < r ≤ 1
• (A3) Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ Lt(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ Lr+tϕ, for r + t ≤ 1
• (A4)¬Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬Ls(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ ¬Lr+sϕ, for r + s ≤ 1
• (A5) Lrϕ → ¬Ls¬ϕ, for r + s > 1
Rules:
• (AR)(Assumption Rule) If ϕ ∈ Γ or ϕ is an instance of axioms, then Γ ⊢ ϕ;
• (CR) (Cut Rule) If Γ ⊢ ψ for all ψ ∈ Σ andΣ ⊢ ϕ, then Γ ⊢ ϕ,
• (DR) Deduction Rule: Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ψ implies Γ ⊢ ϕ → ψ .
• (ARCH): {γ → Lsϕ : s < r} ⊢ γ → Lrϕ.
• (CAR) (Countable Additivity Rule) Γ ⊢ ϕ implies {Lpψ : ψ ∈ω Γ } ⊢ Lpϕ where Γ is countable andω Γ is the set of
conjunctions of finite subsets of Γ .
Sincewe reason not about probabilitymeasures but about general subprobabilitymeasures, we do not include L1⊤ in the
above list as Goldblatt did in [27]. The last rule (CAR) characterizes exactly the continuity from above property of operators
Lr . It is needed in the proof of countable additivity of the measures defined on the canonical models [27]. Note that the rules
(CR) and (DR) are needed but not essential in our axiomatization. Their only function is to aid the deductions through other
inference rules. A relation ⊢ ⊆ 2L0 × L0 is a probability logic if the following rules hold: modus ponens, AR, ARCH, CR,
DR, CAR and uniform substitution (that is, if (Γ , ϕ) ∈ ⊢, then so do all of its substitution instances). Observe that the rule
(ARCH) is the only rule that is really about the indices of the modalities. Since the index set Q ∩ [0, 1] has the Archimedean
property, i.e., the property of having no infinitely small elements, the fact that the rule has infinitely many premises seems
unavoidable. It is easy to check that the consequence relation |= defined in last section is a probability logic. The systemwith
(A0–A5) plus (AR), (CR) and (DR) was originally proposed by Aumann [3]. But this systemwas proved to be incomplete [29].
The rule (ARCH) was added in [44] to show the resulting system is weakly complete. Goldblatt [27] further added (CAR)
to obtain a strongly complete system, which is the above deductive system about ⊢. Aumann constructed the canonical
probability modelwithout any deductive system [3]. Following the same lines as in [3], Heifetz and Mongin [29] proved the
existence of the universal type space, which is essentially the final coalgebra for ∆(M × Id) for some fixed space M . From
the perspective of coalgebra, Moss and Viglizzo [36] further showed that every measurable polynomial functor has a final
coalgebra. Goldblatt [27] provided deduction systems for those coalgebras.
C. Zhou, M. Ying / Theoretical Computer Science 446 (2012) 75–97 81
Although much of this part is adapted from [27,36,45], our focus is not on the deduction system itself but on defining a
pseudometric to measure approximation on the collection of Markov processes through a final coalgebraML0 constructed
out of maximally consistent sets of formulas in probability logic. In [36], Moss and Viglizzo showed that a coalgebra
c∗ : Id∗ → T (Id∗) is final, where each element of Id∗ is the set of formulaswith sort Id (each sort corresponds to an ingredient
of T ) that are satisfied at some state of some coalgebra of T . In Appendix B, we define a translation ◦ from the languageL(T )
with sorts to the languageL0 and show that ◦ is actually a coalgebra isomorphism between c∗ and ourML0 . This translation
is of independent interest.
Given a probability logic Σp, (Γ , ϕ) ∈ Σp is denoted as Γ ⊢Σp ϕ. A set Γ of formulas is Σp-consistent if Γ ⊬Σp ⊥.
A probability logic Σp is Lindenbaum if every Σp-consistent set of formulas has a maximally Σp-consistent extension.
Probability logic Σs is the least Lindenbaum probability logic. In order to streamline our presentation and to emphasize
our main results in the following sections, we will put the proof of the completeness of probability logic in Appendix A. It is
easy to see that the following distribution rule is derivable from (CAR) and (DR):
(DIS) If ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ , then ⊢ Lrϕ ↔ Lrψ .
The canonical Markov processML0 is defined as follows:
• ΩL0 = {Γ ⊆ L0 : Γ is a maximallyΣs-consistent set of formulas}.• [ϕ] = {w ∈ ΩL0 : ϕ ∈ w};• AL0 is the σ -algebra generated by {[ϕ] : ϕ ∈ L0};• The canonical measurable space is defined as ⟨ΩL0 ,AL0⟩;• define TL0(w)([ϕ]) = sup{r ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q : Lrϕ ∈ w};
The above defined TL0(w) on {[ϕ] : ϕ ∈ L0} uniquely determines the subprobability measure TL0(w) on the σ -algebra
AL0 . This unique extension is guaranteed by Theorem 2.2. Such a defined canonical model ML0 = ⟨ΩL0 ,AL0 , TL0⟩ is a
Markov process.
Theorem 2.16 (Strong Completeness). For any Γ ⊆ ΩL0 and s ∈ ΩL0 ,
Γ ⊢Σs ϕ if and only if Γ |= ϕ.
Theorem 2.17. Given aMarkov processM, the descriptionmap d is a zigzagmorphism andmoreover the unique zigzagmorphism
from M to ML0 . This means that ML0 is the final Markov process.
3. Filtration
This section will discuss the main topic: approximation through filtration. We do need such a strong logic as Σs to
construct the final probabilistic transition system. However, for filtration, a much weaker probability logic Σ+ will suffice
(for more details aboutΣ+, one may refer to [45]):
Probability LogicΣ+
• (A0) propositional calculus
• (A1) L0ϕ• (A2) ¬Lr⊥, for 0 < r ≤ 1• (A3) Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ Lt(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ Lr+tϕ, for r + t ≤ 1• (A4) ¬Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ ¬Ls(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ ¬Lr+sϕ, for r + s ≤ 1• (A5) Lrϕ → ¬Ls¬ϕ, for r + s > 1• (DIS) If ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ,⊢ Lrϕ ↔ Lrψ .• (ARCH): If ⊢ γ → Lsϕ for all s < r , then ⊢ γ → Lrϕ.
Probability logic Σ+ is the smallest set of formulas that contains all propositional tautologies in L0 and (A1–A5), and is
closed undermodus ponens, DIS, ARCH and uniform substitution (that is, if ϕ belongs toΣ+, then so do all of its substitution
instances). It is clear thatΣ+ is much simpler thanΣs. Themain difference betweenΣs andΣ+ is thatΣs is concerned about
the deducibility relationwhileΣ+ is about the theoremhood. However, it can be shown [46] that a formula ϕ is a theorem in
Σ+ iff it is also a theorem inΣs, i.e.∅ ⊢Σs ϕ. Sincewe dealwith only finite consistency in the section on filtration, the simpler
Σ+ will suffice. For this reason, finitelyΣs-consistent or finitelyΣ+-consistent will be simply called finitely consistent.
Lemma 3.1 (Lindenbaum Lemma). If Ξ is a finitely-consistent set of formulas, then there is a maximally finitely-consistent Ξ ′
such thatΞ ⊆ Ξ ′.
Definition 3.2. The depth dp(ϕ) of a formula ϕ is defined inductively:
• dp(⊤) := 0;
• dp(¬ϕ) := dp(ϕ);
• dp(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) := max{dp(ϕ1), dp(ϕ2)};• dp(Lrϕ) := dp(ϕ)+ 1. ▹
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Now we define a local languageL0(q, d) to be the largest set of formulas satisfying the following conditions:
• The indices of formulas inL0(q, d) are multiples of 1/q;
• The formulas inL0(q, d) are of depth≤ d;
• Logically equivalent formulas are regarded the same.
The above q is called the accuracy of the language L0(q, d). In particular, L0[ψ] is defined as L0(qψ , dψ ) where qψ is
the accuracy of ψ i.e., the least common multiple of all denominators of the indices appearing in ψ and dψ the depth of ψ .
I[ψ] is the finite set of all rationals in the form of p/qψ ∈ [0, 1]; and it is called the index set of the language L0[ψ]. Note
that L0[ψ] is finite. In general, let L0(q, d) be the set of formulas having accuracy q and depth at most d modulo logical
equivalence where two formulas θ1 and θ2 are logically equivalent if θ1 ↔ θ2 is provable in the deductive systemΣ+. Each
formula in L0(q, d) is logically equivalent to a finite disjunction consisting only of non-equivalent disjuncts, each of the
disjuncts being a conjunction consisting only of non-equivalent conjuncts, each conjunct being either itself inL0(q, d− 1)
or being obtainable from some formula inL0(q, d− 1) by prefixing it either with a modality Lr or¬Lr where r is a multiple
of 1/q. By induction on the depth d, we can show thatL0(q, d) is finite and henceL0[ψ] is finite. In the following, we will
not distinguish between the equivalence classes inL0(q, d) and their representatives.
Definition 3.3. Assume that Θ is a finite set of formulas. Let qΘ be the accuracy of Θ , i.e., the least common denominator
of all rationals occurring inΘ and dΘ the largest depth of formulas inΘ .Θ ismaximal consistent in the languageL(qΘ , dΘ)
if it is consistent and no subset ofL(qΘ , dΘ) properly containingΘ is consistent. ▹
Lemma 3.4 (Lindenbaum Lemma for Finite set of Formulas). Assume that Θ is a finite set of formulas. If dΘ ≤ d and q is a
multiple of qΘ for some integers q and d, then there is a maximal consistent extensionΘ(q, d) in the languageL0(q, d) such that
Θ ⊆ Θ(q, d).
In the following, a language is meant to be the whole language L0 or the finite language L0(q, d) for some integers q
and d.
Given a Markov process M = ⟨Ω,A, T ⟩, two states s and s′ in Ω are logically equivalent up to L0(q, d) (denoted as
s v(q,d) s′) if they satisfy the same set of formulas inL0(q, d). In other words,
s v(q,d) s′ if, for all formulas ϕ ∈ L0(q, d),M, s |= ϕ ⇔ M, s′ |= ϕ.
It is easy to see that the above defined v(q,d) is an equivalence relation. We denote the equivalence class of a state s with
respect to v(q,d) by |s|(q,d). Note that |s|(q,d) is A-measurable. The mapping s → |s|(q,d) from a state to its equivalence class
is called the natural map. Recall that Iq = {p/q : 0 ≤ p/q ≤ 1, p is a natural number}. Any Markov process M(q,d) :=
⟨Ω(q,d),A(q,d), T(q,d)⟩with T(q,d)(|s|(q,d)) a subprobabilitymeasure onA(q,d) for each |s|(q,d) satisfying the following conditions
is called a filtered Markov process ofM:
1. Ω(q,d) = {|s|(q,d) : s ∈ Ω};
2. A(q,d) = 2Ω(q,d) , i.e. the powerset of the filtered carrier set;
3. for all formulas Lrϕ ∈ L(q,d) where r ∈ Iq, T(q,d)(|s|(q,d), [ϕ]M) ≥ r ⇔ T (s, [[ϕ]]M) ≥ r where [ϕ]M = {|s|(q,d) ∈ Ω(q,d) :
M, s |= ϕ}.
Note that, in order to distinguish filtered Markov models from canonical models in the following Remark 3.7, we put the
index tuples as subscripts.
Remark 3.5. It is easy to prove thatΩ(q,d) is finite and so isA(q,d). The third clause is the most important in the definition,
and it will be used to show the following filtration theorem. The two directions of the clause correspond exactly to the two
similar characteristic clauses in the definition of a filtered model in qualitative modal logic (page 78 in [8]). It is easy to see
that the following inequality holds:
|T(q,d)(|s|(q,d), A′)− T (s,|s|(q,d)∈A′ |s|(q,d))| ≤ 1/q.
It would be interesting to compare the third clause to zigzag morphism. In zigzag morphism, the two related transition
probabilities are equal to each other while, in the third clause of the above definition, the related probabilities do not need
to be equal, but are required to satisfy the same finite set of inequalities. It is easy to check that the following T s(q,d) satisfies
the third clause:
for each |s|(q,d) ∈ Ω(q,d), T s(q,d)(|s|(q,d)) = T (s′) for some s′ ∈ |s|(q,d) in the sense that
T s(q,d)(|s|(q,d), A′) = T (s′,

|s|(q,d)∈A′ |s|(q,d)) for all A′ ∈ A(q,d).
So such defined T s(q,d) induces a natural filtered model ⟨Ω(q,d),A(q,d), T s(q,d)⟩.
Lemma 3.6. Let [ϕ]M denote the set {|s|(q,d) : s ∈ [[ϕ]]M} for ϕ ∈ L0(q, d). The following holds: 2Ω(q,d) = {[ϕ]M : ϕ ∈ L0
(q, d)}.
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Proof. Weonly need propositional reasoning to show this lemma. It is easy to see that {[ϕ]M : ϕ ∈ L0(q, d)} ⊆ 2Ω(q,d) . Given
any setΞ ∈ 2Ω(q,d) , define Ξ¯ = {s¯(q,d) : |s|(q,d) ∈ Ξ}where s¯(q,d) = {ϕ ∈ L0(q, d) : M, s′ |= ϕ for all s′ ∈ |s|(q,d)}.
Let ϕΞ be the disjunction of the conjunctions of formulas in each s¯(q,d) in Ξ¯ . ϕΞ is logically equivalent to a formula ϕ′Ξ in
L0(q, d). It is straightforward to check thatΞ = [ϕ′Ξ ]M . So we have shown the other direction. 
Remark 3.7. It is important to note the connection of the above filtered Markov process to the finite canonical model
that was used to prove the completeness of different deductive systems for probability logics [29,44,45], which is also the
inspiration of our work in this paper. A canonical modelM(q, d) := ⟨Ω(q, d), 2Ω(q,d), T (q, d)⟩ is constructed as follows:
• Ω(q, d) is the set of all maximally consistent subsets of formulas inL(q, d);
• The powerset 2Ω(q,d) is the set of events;
• for eachΓ ∈ Ω(q, d), T (q, d)(Γ ) is defined either through the Rockafellar Lemma [29] or through amaximally consistent
extension to the languageL0 [45].
In [45], the first author has shown that not only does this canonical model have finitely many states, but also it is actually
computable, the transition probabilities are computable. In some sense, the above filtered Markov process M(q,d) can be
regarded as a kind of submodel of the canonical model M(q, d) in the sense that each state |s|(q,d) can be represented as s¯,
which is a state inΩ(q, d) andM(q,d) can be embedded into the canonical modelM(q, d) by |s| → s¯with a variation 1/q in
transition probabilities.
Example 3.8. Each approximation through filtration is guided by a local language L0(q, d). Here we adapt the example on
page 179 in [15] so that we may compare the approximation there with our following one through filtration.
The state space is S := {s, t} ∪ [0, 3], which is a continuous state space. The transition probabilities on the space are
defined as follows:
• If x ∈ [0, 1],
T (x, [0, y)) = x+ y
4
, where 0 ≤ y ≤ 1;
T (x, {1}) = 1− x
4
T (x, (1, 1+ y]) = y
4
T (x, (2, 2+ y]) = xy
4
• if x ∈ (1, 2], T (x, {s}) = 1;
• if x ∈ (2, 3], T (x, {t}) = 18 .
In order to make our approximation transparent and simple, we drop the labels in the example in [15], change the last
transition from 1 to 18 and consider the language L0. First we deal with the filtration through the local language L0(2, 1).
Note that L0(2, 1) does not contain any propositional letters. For example, L 1
2
⊤ is a formula in this set. According to the
above transition function T , we know that
• if x ∈ [0, 1], T (x, S) = 3+x4 ;• if x ∈ (1, 2], T (x, S) = 1;
• if x ∈ (2, 3], T (x, S) = 18
hence the equivalence classes with respect to the local language L0(2, 1) are: [0, 1), [1, 2], (2, 3] and {s, t}. Note that the
only significant change to the partition of the state space in the definition of T is the move of 1 from [0, 1] to [1, 2] because
T (1, S) = 1 and also T (x, S) = 1 for all x ∈ (1, 2]. Now we define the transition probabilities on the filtered state space
S(2,1) := {[0, 1), [1, 2], (2, 3], {s, t}} according to the T s(q,d) defined in Remark 3.5.
1. If x′ = [0, 1), define T(2,1)(x) = T (0), namely,
• T(2,1)(x′, [0, 1)) = T (0, [0, 1)) = 14 ,
• T(2,1)(x′, [1, 2]) = T (0, [1, 2]) = 12 ,• T(2,1)(x′, (2, 3]) = T (0, (2, 3]) = 0;
• T(2,1)(x′, {s, t}) = T (0, {s, t}) = 0.
2. If x′ = [1, 2], define T(2,1)(x) = T (1), namely,
• T(2,1)(x′, [0, 1)) = T (1, [0, 1)) = 14 ,
• T(2,1)(x′, [1, 2]) = T (1, [1, 2]) = 14 ,
• T(2,1)(x′, (2, 3]) = T (1, (2, 3]) = 14 ;• T(2,1)(x′, {s, t}) = T (1, {s, t}) = 0.
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Fig. 1. The filtered Markov processM(2,1) .
3. If x′ = (2, 3], define T(2,1)(x) = T (3), namely,
• T(2,1)(x′, [0, 1)) = T (3, [0, 1)) = 0,
• T(2,1)(x′, [1, 2]) = T (3, [1, 2]) = 0,
• T(2,1)(x′, (2, 3]) = T (3, (2, 3]) = 0.
• T(2,1)(x′, {s, t}) = T (3, {s, t}) = 18 .
Note that in each equality the second arguments are treated differently. For example, [0, 1) in T(2,1)(x, [0, 1)) is an
equivalence class with respect toL0(2, 1)while [0, 1) in T (0, [0, 1)) is a subset of S.
We draw the filtered Markov processM(2,1) in an informal way in Fig. 1.
Now we are constructing the filtration with respect to the local language L0(2, 2). Here we only need to consider the
transition probabilities from each ∼(2,1)-equivalence class to all finite unions of these equivalence classes. Essentially we
obtain a table accommodating all necessary information about these transition probabilities:
[0,1) [1,2] (2,3] [0,2] [1, 3] [0,1) ∪ (2,3] [0,3] {s, t}
[0,1) x+14
2−x
4
x
4
3
4
1
2
2x+1
4
3+x
4 0
{1} 12 14 14 34 12 34 1 0
(1,2] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
(2,3] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
{s, t} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
For example, the entry 2x+14 indicates the transition probability from [0, 1) to the union [0, 1) ∪ (2, 3]. If x ∈ [0, 12 ), then
2x+1
4 ∈ (0, 12 ); if x = 1/2, then 2x+14 = 12 ; if x ∈ ( 12 , 1), then 2x+14 ∈ ( 12 , 1). This implies that, for [0, 1), the languageL0(2, 2)
distinguishes among [0, 12 ), { 12 } and ( 12 , 1). After applying the same analysis to other entries (actually mainly to those in the
first row), we can obtain all∼(2,2)-equivalence classes as follows:
S(2,2) :=

{0},

0,
1
2

,

1
2

,

1
2
, 1

, {1}, (1, 2], (2, 3], {s, t}

.
Here we take the ∼(2,2)-equivalence class (0, 12 ) as an illustration how to define a filtered model. For (0, 12 ), we define
T(2,2)((0, 12 )) = T ( 14 ) in the sense that, for each ∼(2,2)-equivalence class C, T(2,2)((0, 12 ))(C) = T ( 14 )(C). For example,
T(2,2)((0, 12 ))((0,
1
2 )) = T ( 14 )((0, 12 )) = 316 .
3.1. Finite approximation through filtration
Compared to the analytical approximation in [15], our approximation through filtration is logical in the sense that this
kind of approximation is guided by finite logical languages L0(q, d). In the remainder of this section, we use it to show the
main results in [15] in a simpler way.
Theorem 3.9 (Filtration Theorem). Let M := ⟨Ω,A, T ⟩ be a Markov process and M(q,d) := ⟨Ω(q,d),A(q,d), T(q,d)⟩ be a filtered
Markov process throughL0(q, d). For any formula ϕ ∈ L0(q, d) and any point s ∈ Ω ,
M, s |= ϕ iff M(q,d), |s|(q,d) |= ϕ.
Equivalently, [[ϕ]]M =M(q,d),|s′|(q,d)|=ϕ |s′|(q,d).
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Proof. We prove this by induction on the formula ϕ.
1. Boolean case. This is straightforward from the fact that |s|(q,d) is a maximal and consistent set of formulas in the above
local language.
2. Crucial case: ϕ = Lrϕ′ where r is a multiple of 1/q.
M(q,d), |s|(q,d) |= Lrϕ′ ⇔ T(q,d)(|s|(q,d))([[ϕ′]]M(q,d)) ≥ r
⇔ T(q,d)(|s|(q,d))({|s′|(q,d) : M(q,d), |s′|(q,d) |= ϕ′}) ≥ r
⇔ T (s)
 
M(q,d),|s′|(q,d)|=ϕ′
|s′|(q,d)
 ≥ r
⇔ T (s)([[ϕ′]]M) ≥ r
⇔ M, s |= Lrϕ′.
The fourth equivalence is based on the induction hypothesis and the third is on the third clause of the definition of
filtration. 
Corollary 3.10. Let M := ⟨Ω,A, T ⟩ be a Markov process and M(q,d) := ⟨Ω(q,d), A(q,d), T(q,d)⟩ be a filtered Markov process
throughL0(q, d). For any formula ϕ ∈ L0(q, d) and any point s ∈ Ω ,
|T(q,d)(|s|(q,d))([[ϕ]]M(q,d))− T (s)([[ϕ]]M) ≤ 1/q.
Remark 3.11. The above Filtration Theorem says that any formula of the finite restricted type which is satisfiable in a
Markov process is also satisfied in a finite state filtered Markov process. Although there are infinitely many subprobability
measures for the filtered process, they satisfy the same finite set of linear inequalities as the corresponding transition
subprobabilities in the original process, which is indicated in the third clause of our definition of filtration. According to
the Finite Model Theorem(Theorem 3.13) in [45], we know that each transition subprobability can be a multiple of 1/n for
some natural number n. This also means that we can make all transition subprobabilities in each filtered Markov process to
be rational and still the above filtration theorem holds. Compared with the measure-theoretical approach to finite model
property in [15], our method is much simpler and in keeping with filtration in qualitative modal logic [8]. In the remainder
of this section, we will use filtration to show a similar result to Theorem 4.5 in [15].
Now we show that one can reconstruct the original process M from the approximants M(n,n) where M(n,n) is a filtered
process of the original M through a finite set L0(n, n) of formulas. Just as Theorem 4.5 in [15], we recover mainly all the
transition subprobability information, i.e., the dynamic aspects of the process. For any two states x and x′ ofM , x ≈ x′ denotes
that they satisfy the same set of formulas inL0. It is easy to see that≈ is an equivalence relation.
Theorem 3.12. Assume that M = ⟨S,A, T ⟩ is a Markov process that is maximally collapsed in the sense that M = M/ ≈. If we
are given all finite state approximants M(n,n), then we can recover M.
Proof. We can recover the state space by just taking the union of states at any level of any approximants M(n,n) because,
according to the Filtration Theorem,
[[ϕ]]M =

M(n,n),|s|(n,n) |=ϕ
|s|(n,n).
SinceM is a maximally collapsed Markov process,A is generated byAL0 := {[[ϕ]]M : ϕ is a formula in the language of
L0}(by the Corollary 4.15 of [13]). It is easy to check that AL0 is a field. For any s ∈ S and any formula ϕ (in the language
L0(n, n) for n > k for some k), define
µ(s)([[ϕ]]M) = lim
n→∞ T(n,n)(|s|(n,n))([[ϕ]]M(n,n)).
Claim 1. limn→∞ T(n,n)(|s|(n,n))([[ϕ]]M(n,n)) exists.
In order to show the claim, it suffices to show that, for any ε, there is an N such that, if n ≥ N , |T(n,n)(|s|(n,n))([ϕ]M(n,n)) −
T(n+p,n+p)(|s|(n+p,n+p))([ϕ]M(n+p,n+p))| ≤ ε for any natural number p. For a given ε, there is an N such that 1/N < ε/2. Also
for any natural numbers p, n > N ,
|T(n,n)(|s|(n,n))([[ϕ]]M(n,n))− T(n+p,n+p)(|s|(n+p,n+p))([[ϕ]]M(n+p,n+p))|
≤ |T(n,n)(|s|(n,n))([[ϕ]]M(n,n))− T (s)([[ϕ]]M)| + |T(n+p,n+p)(|s|(n+p,n+p))([[ϕ]]M(n+p,n+p))− T (s)([[ϕ]]M)|
≤ 1/n+ 1/(n+ p)
≤ 2/N
≤ ε.
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The second equality follows from the third clause of the definition of filtration and from the filtration theorem. By
Cauchy’s criterion for sequence convergence [28], we know that the above limit exists. This is to say, µ(s)([[ϕ]]M) is well-
defined.
Claim 2. For any s ∈ S and for any formula ϕ, µ(s)([[ϕ]]M) = T (s)([[ϕ]]M).
Note that
0 ≤ |µ(s)([[ϕ]]M)− T (s)([[ϕ]]M)|
= limn→∞|T (s)([[ϕ]]M)− T(n,n)(|s|(n,n))([[ϕ]]M(n,n))|
≤ limn→∞1/n
= 0.
That is to say,µ(s)([[ϕ]]M) = T (s)([[ϕ]]M). The third step similarly follows from the third clause of the definition of filtration
and the second from Corollary 3.10. So we have shown that, for any s ∈ S, the above defined µ(s) and T (s)matches on the
algebraAL0 . This implies that the subprobability measure µ
∗(s) on the σ -algebraA generated by µ(s) is the same as T (s).
So we have recovered the original Markov process. In other words, the Markov process M is uniquely determined by its
finite approximantsM(n,n). 
Just like the Dedekind’s cut for reals, we want to use finite rational Markov processes (in the sense that all transition
subprobabilities are rationals) to approximate any Markov process. In Remark 3.11, we know that all transition
subprobabilities in each filtered process can be rational. So any Markov process M can be recovered by all its finite
approximantsM(n,n) with all transition subprobabilities rational.
Corollary 3.13. Assume that M = ⟨S,A, T ⟩ is maximally collapsed in the sense that M = M/ ≈. ThenM is uniquely determined
by its rational approximants M(n,n) with all transition subprobabilities rational.
This corollary is similar to Theorem 4.9 in [15]. From this Corollary, we know that any Markov process can be
approximatedby rational finite filteredprocesses,whichprovides a countable basis forMarkovprocesses. In thenext section,
we will make this approximation precise by defining a metric on the collection of Markov processes.
Since the collection of finite rationalMarkovprocesses is countable and anyMarkovprocess canbe approximatedby finite
rational processes in a certain metric space, it is reasonable to expect that the collection of Markov processes endowed with
this metric is a separable space. In the following section, we will simulate the work in [16] to show that the collection of
Markov processes is also a Polish space. In some sense, we answer the question raised in Section 6 of [15] whether the class
of Markov processes can be a Polish space.
4. Metric
Our main motivation for the following metrics for Markov processes comes from two sources. The first is the technical
definition of such metrics through a class of functions expounded by Kozen [34] to generalize logic to handle probabilistic
phenomena [16]. We know from the logical characterization of bisimulation in [14] that if two processes are not bisimilar,
there will be a formula that distinguishes them. We want the metric to formalize the intuition that two processes are
bisimilar iff the ‘‘distance" between them is zero. Our definition of the metric is based on the smallest formula that
distinguishes them. Also we need to consider the fact that the process might differ immediately but do so with probabilities
that are very close. In this case, we should think that they might be very ‘‘far" away from each other. Just as in [16], we
introduce a discount factor c to give more weight to the probability difference that arises earlier in the evolution of the
process.
So our metrics take into account the following two factors: the complexity of the distinguishing formula which is
measured by its depth and themaximal probability difference by which any formula distinguishes them.
Our second source is the definition of metric through a final coalgebra in van Breugel and Worrell [40]. Their metric is
based on finding a final coalgebra for a certain functor on the category of metric spaces and non-expansive maps. This final
coalgebra is also a metric space and thus naturally gives a metric on the state spaces of any Markov processes through the
unique map induced by finality.
So we combine these two to provide a (pseudo)metric for Markov processes. First we construct a final coalgebra for
the functor S which maps X to ∆(X + 1) through probability logic Σs in the restricted language L0, which is defined on
Section 2.2. Second we define a metric on this final coalgebra.
Recall that ΩL0 is the set of all maximally Σs-consistent set of formulas in the language L0. For any formula ϕ in the
languageL0, [ϕ] denotes the subset {s ∈ L0 : ϕ ∈ s}. It is easy to check that the subsetA0L0 = {[ϕ] : ϕ is a formula in the
language L0} of the powerset 2ΩL0 is an algebra. Let AL0 denote the σ -algebra generated by the algebra A0L0 . Define the
transition subprobability function on the canonical model as follows: for any s ∈ ΩL0 ,
TL0(s)([ϕ]) = sup{r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] : Lrϕ ∈ s}
Theorem 2.17 has shown thatML0 := ⟨ΩL0 ,AL0 , TL0⟩ is the final Markov process for the above functor S.
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For any s, s′ ∈ ΩC0 , define dcL0(s, s′) = sup{csdp(ϕ)· | TL0(s)([ϕ]0) − TL0(s′)([ϕ]0) |: ϕ ∈ L0} where sdp(ϕ) denotes the
smallest depth of the formulas which are logically equivalent to ϕ in Σs4 and c(∈ [0, 1]) is a discount factor. It is easy to
check that it is a (pseudo)metric. Note that being smallest depth guarantees that the metric is independent of the choice of
representative formulas. It follows from the definition of dcL0 that
Proposition 4.1. For any two states s, s′ ∈ ΩL0 , the following are equivalent:
• they are bisimilar;
• they satisfy the same set of formulas;
• dcL0(s, s′) = 0.
The following is the main theorem of this section which tells us that the final Markov processes with the metric dcL0 is a
Polish space. For simplicity, we will show only the case when c = 1. In this case, we simply write d1L0 as dL0 . Actually the
proofs of other cases when c < 1 are similar.
Theorem 4.2. (MC0 , dL0) is a complete metric space.
Proof. Assume that {sn}∞n=1 is a Cauchy sequence of states of ΩL0 , i.e. given an ε > 0, there is a natural number N0 such
that, if n,m ≥ N0, dL0(sn, sm) < ε, namely
sup{| TL0(sn)([ϕ]0)− TL0(sm)([ϕ]0) |: ϕ ∈ L0} < ε/4.
Fix this ε in this proof. It is easy to see that, for each ϕ ∈ L0, {TL0(sn)([ϕ])}∞n=1 is a Cauchy sequence in the real interval[0, 1]. This also implies that limn→∞ TL0(sn)([ϕ]) exists.
Set ρ : AL0 → [0, 1] as follows:
ρ([ϕ]) = lim
n→∞ TL0(sn)([ϕ]).
Claim 3. ρ is a finitely additive set function onAL0 .
Proof of this claim: Assume that [ϕi](1 ≤ i ≤ m) are disjoint.
ρ

m
i=1
[ϕi]

= lim
n→∞ TL0(sn)

m
i=1
([ϕi])

= lim
n→∞
m
i=1
TL0(sn)([ϕi])
=
m
i=1
lim
n→∞ TL0(sn)([ϕi])
=
m
i=1
ρ(([ϕi])).
So indeed ρ is a finitely additive set function.
Claim 4. limn→∞ d(TL0(sn), ρ) = 0 where d(TL0(sn), ρ) = sup{|TL0(sn)([ϕ] − ρ([ϕ])| : ϕ ∈ L0}.
Proof of the claim: First note that for eachϕ, there is a natural numberNϕ such that, if n ≥ Nϕ then | TL0(sn)([ϕ])−ρ([ϕ]) |<
ε/4. Pick up a natural number N ′ϕ that is bigger than both Nϕ and N0. If n ≥ N0, then
|TL0(sn)([ϕ])− ρ([ϕ])| ≤ |TL0(sn)([ϕ])− TL0(sN ′ϕ )([ϕ])| + |TL0(sN ′ϕ )([ϕ])− ρ([ϕ])|
≤ ε/4+ ε/4
= ε/2.
The first ε came from the fact that N ′ϕ ≥ N0 and the second one from limn→∞ TL0(sn)([ϕ]0) = ρ([ϕ]0). In short,
if n ≥ N0, then |TL0(sn)([ϕ]0)− ρ([ϕ]0)| ≤ ε/2 for all ϕ ∈ L0.
It follows immediately that limn→∞ d(T c0 (sn), ρ) = 0.
Claim 5. ρ is a (countably additive) subprobability measure onAL0 .
Proof of the claim: The essential part is to show that ρ is countably additive. Because of Theorem 2.1, it suffices to show the
following statement:
If [ϕ1] ⊇ [ϕ2] ⊇ · · · such that∞i=1[ϕi] = ∅, then limi→∞ ρ([ϕi]) = 0.
4 We have not yet found any algorithm to compute sdp(ϕ) for each ϕ.
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Since TL0(sn) is a subprobability measure for each n, limi→∞ TL0(sn)([ϕi]) = 0. In particular, for the above natural number
N0, limi→∞ TL0(sN0)([ϕi]) = 0. That is to say, there is a natural numberMN0 such that, if i ≥ MN0 , then TL0(sN0([ϕi]) < ε/2.
We have that if i ≥ MN0 ,
|ρ([ϕi])| ≤ |ρ([ϕi])− T c0 (sN0)([ϕi])| + |TL0(sN0)([ϕi])|
≤ ε/2+ ε/2
= ε.
Note thatMN0 depends only on ε. So we have finished the proof of the claim.
Consider the set
Γ := {Lrϕ,¬Ltϕ : ϕ ∈ ΦL0 , r, t ∈ Q , r ≤ ρ([ϕ]0), t > ρ([ϕ]0)}.
By a similar argument to that of Theorem 2.16, we know that, since Γ is defined from ρ which is the canonical measure
on the canonical measurable space ⟨ΩL0 ,AL0⟩, it is Σs-consistent. So it is contained in a maximally Σs-consistent set of
formulas s∞ ∈ ML0 . It is easy to see that such a s∞ is unique because any state in ML0 is a maximally Σs-consistent
set of formulas in L0 . In other words, Γ has a unique maximally Σs-consistent extension in L0. We conclude that
limn→∞ dL0(sn, s∞) = 0 and (ML0 , dL0) is a complete metric space. 
Nowwe discuss how to define ametric on the collection ofMarkov processeswith initial states. LetM1 = ⟨Ω1, s1,A1, T1⟩
and M2 = ⟨Ω2, s2,A2, T2⟩ be two Markov processes. Since ML0 = ⟨ΩL0 ,AL0 , TL0⟩ is final, there is a unique map f 10 from
M1 toML0 induced by the finality and similarly a unique map f
2
0 fromM2 toML0 . From Theorem 2.17, we know that these
two maps are the description maps fromM1 andM2 toML0 , respectively. We simply define the metric between these two
processes as follows:
dL0(M1,M2) := dL0(f 10 (s1), f 20 (s2)).
Corollary 4.3. With respect to the above defined metric, the approximation in Theorem 3.13 can be also stated as limn→∞
dL0((M(n,n),M) = 0.
Theorem 4.4. The metric space of Markov processes is separable.
Proof. This theorem follows directly from Theorem 3.13 in the last section. 
Corollary 4.5. The space of Markov processes with dL0 is a Polish space.
Remark 4.6. In the literature there are two well known approaches to define metrics on probabilistic transition systems
or Markov processes. The first metric dF c in [16] is through a real-valued modal logic F c (defined in the next paragraph)
adapted from the work by Kozen [34]. The second one dC is to provide a coalgebraic definition [40]. Van Breugel andWorrell
[40] showed that these two approaches are equivalent in the sense that
for all x1, x2 ∈ Mf , d
′
F c (x1,x2)
c = d′C (x1, x2)
where c is the discount factor andMf is the final probabilistic transition system or the final Markov process in the setting of
this paper.
Desharnais et al. [16] defined a set of functions which are sufficient to characterize bisimulation. They defined a set of
functional expressions by giving an explicit syntax. For each c ∈ (0, 1], we consider a family F c of functional expressions
generated by the following grammar:
f := 1 | 1− f | ⟨a⟩f | min(f1, f2) | sup
i∈N
fi | f ⊖ q
where q is a rational. Each collection F c of functional expressions induces a distance function as follows:
dF c (P ,Q) = sup
f∈Fc
|fP (p0)− fQ(q0)|
where p0 and q0 are initial states of two Markov processes P andQ respectively. One of the main theorem in [16] says that
the distance of two processes is 0 iff they are bisimilar.
Van Breugel andWorrell [40] employed themachinery from category theory to show that there is a final Markov process
and then define a metric through this final system. Moreover, they showed that their approach to define metric is the same
as that by Desharnais et al. through functional expressions [40]. Their metric is closely related to the Hutchinson metric in
the literature [24].
In contrast, our method is purely logical in the sense that it combines these two approaches in a uniform framework of
probability logicΣs. Not only do we employ probability logic to construct final Markov process, but also we define a metric
on the final one through the set of formulas instead through functional expressions and the metric for Markov processes is
defined through the unique map to the final one induced by the finality.
Compared to the metric dF c defined through functional expressions by Desharnais et al. [16], our dcL0 ismore appropriate
and direct in the sense that the complexities of distinguishing logical formulas instead of distinguishing functional
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expressions are used to measure the distances among Markov processes. The fundamental result in [16] states that, given
any formula ϕ ∈ L0 and c ∈ (0, 1], there exists a functional expression fϕ ∈ F c+ such that for every state s of any Markov
process M , fϕ(s) > 0 iff M, s |= ϕ. So the value of any functional expressions in F c corresponds to a quantitative measure
of the extent to which the state satisfies a formula ofL0. That is to say, given any two states s and s′, the distance dF c (s, s′)
measures the difference of satisfactions of formulas inL0 at these two states. However, dcL0 provides a quantitative valuation
of the combination of the difference of transition probabilities of different events (represented by logical formulas) and of the
complexity of the distinguishing formulas (captured by the depths of these formulas). In this sense, dcL0 is more appropriate
than dF c0 as a pseudometric to characterize the differences of the dynamics of Markov processes.
Although the approaches to define dcL0 and dC are different, they are equivalent inmeasure-theoretical topology, namely,
they induce the samemetric topology in the setting of [40,39]. Here we take c = 1 as an example. LetM f = ⟨S, t, dS⟩ be the
final coalgebra of the subprobability functor which maps X to ∆(X + 1) where t is the transition function and dS induces
a Borel σ -algebra BS on S. If BS is also generated by {[[ϕ]]M f : ϕ ∈ L0} where [[ϕ]]M f = {x ∈ S : M f , x |= ϕ}, one may
apply the well-known theorem on weak convergence in measure theory (Theorem 2.5.17 in [24], Theorem 25.8 in [7]) to
show that, on the final Markov process M f , the metric dC (in the form of Hutchinson metric here) induces the same metric
topology as that by dL0 .
One advantagewith this newmetric dcL0 is that we can show in a natural analytical way that the class of Markov processes
is a Polish space.
5. Future work
We are developing a non-metric theory of approximating Markov transition systems through uniform topological
spaces.5 As far as we know, all the approaches of approximating Markov transition systems employ metrics to measure the
distances among different systems [16,12,41] and all associated metric spaces there are uniformly complete. In some sense,
qualitative reasoning is more essential than quantitative one. They aremore interested in reasoning about closeness instead
in the numerical value of the nearness of different systems. In general topology, this kind of reasoning is related to uniformity
properties. To put it more precisely, uniform spaces provide a uniform framework for approximation of Markov transitive
systems. This approach can also ease the technical arguments involving rationals and reals in the previous literature.
We note that there is a predecessor to this kind of work. In [19], Doberkat has observed that the complete metric space
as a type model proposed by MacQueen, Plotkin and Sethi is a special case of complete uniformities. The main technical
innovation of the paper is the formulation of uniformities on a set of types and the establishment of the existence of
recursively defined types through a fixed-point theorem over uniform structures.
Our strategy is as follows. First we would define a functor on the category of uniform topologies as objects and
uniform continuity as morphisms. Next we would consider a coalgebraic definition of morphisms and uniformly topological
bisimilarity. The main result that we are looking for is an appropriate Hennessy–Milner logic characterizing uniform
bisimilarity. The existence of the fixed point theorem for complete uniform spaces that Doberkat proved in [19] is expected
to show this kind of Hennessy–Milner property for continuous time stochastic logic with a fixed point operator [22,21].
Alfaro et al. [1] introduced two fundamental notions of equivalences and metrics for two-player games over finite state
space for an infinite number of rounds where the goals of the winning games are expressed in the quantitative µ-calculus.
These two notions can be regarded as the canonical extensions to games, of the classical notions of metrics and bisimulation
for probabilistic transition systems. We expect to explore the connection of this extension with continuous time stochastic
logic with a fixed point operator [22].
We have in mind some other approximations of Markov processes in [10], especially approximation through averaging
in [9]. In parallel to the approaches there, we are developing a logical deductive system for expectation and following the
same line as in this paper to approximate Markov processes.
We also expect to apply the above coalgebraic perspective of complete uniform spaces to approximate bisimilarity
defined by Ying [43,42]. In Ying’s theory on approximate bisimilarity, the actual numerical values of the differences are
less important than the qualitative reasoning as in uniform spaces. This similarity may provide a setting to combine the
Hennessy–Milner logic for uniform spaces and approximate bisimilarity.
The probabilistic transition systems that we consider in this paper are discrete time, continuous state space models.
Now we are generalizing our above results about this kind of models to continuous-time Markov processes(CTMPs), which
are an important class of stochastic processes that have been widely used in software engineering [5,6]. Continuous-time
stochastic logic provides a characterization of bisimilarity for CTMPs [17]. Approximate bisimilarity is also a central notion in
this work. Not only does it provide a means for approximating a continuous-time Markov process, but also it is a technique
to aggregate the state space. Approximate bisimilarity for CTMPs is also one topic that we are working on now.
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Appendix A. Completeness
Proof of Lemma 2.12. We prove this by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
• Base case when ϕ := ⊤. Obvious.
• Boolean cases. The proof is straightforward.
• Assume that ϕ := Lrψ .
w ∈ f −1([[ϕ]]M2) ⇔ f (w) ∈ [[ϕ]]M2
⇔ M2, f (w) |= Lrψ
⇔ T2(f (w))([[ψ]]M2) ≥ r
⇔ T1(w)(f −1([[ψ]]M2)) ≥ r
⇔ T1(w)([[ψ]]M1) ≥ r
⇔ w ∈ [[Lrψ]]M1 .
The fourth equivalence is based on the second condition in the definition of zigzagmorphism and the fifth is according
to the induction hypothesis. 
Proof of Lemma 2.13. We prove the lemma by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
• Base case ϕ := ⊤. Obvious.
• Boolean cases: the proof is straightforward.
• ϕ := Lrψ .
ϕ ∈ d(w) ⇔ M1, w |= Lrψ
⇔ T1(w)([[ψ]]M1) ≥ r
⇔ T1(w)(f −1([[ψ]]M2)) ≥ r
⇔ T2(f (w))([[ψ]]M2) ≥ r
⇔ Lrψ ∈ d(f (w)).
The third equivalence is based on Lemma 2.12 and the fourth is on Part (2) in the definition of zigzag morphism. 
In the following, we focus on the proof of the completeness. Whenever no confusion arises, we drop subscriptsΣp in⊢Σp
and simply write ⊢.
Theorem A.1. The following principles are provable inΣp:
1. If ⊢ ϕ → ψ , then ⊢ Lrϕ → Lrψ ;
2. ⊢ Lrϕ → Lsϕ if r ≥ s;
Proof. We reason insideΣp.
1. ⊢ ϕ → ψ (Assumption)
⊢ ϕ ↔ ϕ ∧ ψ (A0)
⊢ Lrϕ ↔ Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) (DIS)
⊢ Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ L0(¬ϕ ∧ ψ)→ Lr(ψ) (A3)
⊢ L0(¬ϕ ∧ ψ) (A1)
⊢ Lr(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ Lr(ψ) (A0)
⊢ Lrϕ → Lrψ (A0)
2. If r = t , it is trivially true. Assume that r > t .
⊢ ¬Lt(ϕ ∧ ϕ) ∧ ¬Lr−t(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)→ ¬Lrϕ (A4)
⊢ ¬Lr−t(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) (A2)
⊢ ¬Ltϕ → ¬Lrϕ (DIS and A0)
⊢ Lrϕ → Ltϕ (A0). 
Lemma A.2. The following two propositions hold:
1. If ⊢ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ), then ⊢ Lrϕ ∧ Lsψ → Lr+s(ϕ ∨ ψ), for r + s ≤ 1;
2. If ⊢ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ), then ⊢ ¬Lrϕ ∧ ¬Lsψ → ¬Lr+s(ϕ ∨ ψ), for r + s ≤ 1.
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Proof. Assume that⊢ ¬(ϕ∧ψ). It follows that⊢ ϕ → ¬ψ and⊢ ψ → ¬ϕ. Moreover, (ϕ∨ψ)∧ϕ ↔ ϕ, (ϕ∨ψ)∧ψ ↔ ψ
and (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ψ → (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ϕ. It follows from (A3) that
⊢ Lr((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ϕ) ∧ Ls((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ϕ)→ Lr+s(ϕ ∨ ψ).
From (DIS) and (A0), we know
⊢ Lrϕ ∧ Lsψ → Lr((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ϕ) ∧ Ls((ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬ϕ).
The above two imply that:
⊢ Lrϕ ∧ Lsψ → Lr+s(ϕ ∨ ψ).
The proof of the second part is similar to that of the first part. 
In such a standard logic Σ as first order logic or normal modal logic, the deducibility relation ⊢ is defined only on
propositional calculus:
Γ ⊢Σ ϕ iff ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ϕ is a theorem ofΣ for some ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn ∈ Γ .
So it holds forΣ that strong completeness=weak completeness+ compactness. However, this equivalence is not true for
infinitary logics likeΣp whose deducibility relation is defined through such an additional infinitary rule as (ARCH). It is easy
to see that compactness fails forΣp.
However, we show in the following that the above deductive system is indeed strongly completewith respect to the class
of probability models.
Lemma A.3. 1. If ϕ ∈ Γ , then Γ ⊢ ϕ;
2. (Monotonicity) If Γ ⊢ ϕ and Γ ⊂ ∆, then∆ ⊢ ϕ;
3. (Detachment) If Γ ⊢ ϕ and Γ ⊢ ϕ → ψ , then Γ ⊢ ψ ;
4. Γ ⊢ ϕ → ψ implies Γ , ϕ ⊢ ψ ;
5. (Implication Rule) If Γ ⊢ ϕ, then {ψ → γ : γ ∈ Γ } ⊢ ψ → ϕ.
Proof. All these are straightforward from the definition. See Chapter 9 in [26]. 
Definition A.4. A set Γ of formulas is
• negation complete if for every ϕ ∈ ΦL, ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ ;
• Σp-inconsistent if Γ ⊢Σp ⊥, andΣp-consistent otherwise;• finitelyΣp-consistent if any finite subset of Γ isΣp-consistent;
• maximally finitelyΣp-consistent if finitelyΣp-consistent but no proper extension is finitelyΣp-consistent;
• maximallyΣp-consistent ifΣp-consistent but no proper extension isΣp-consistent;
• maximal if it is negation complete andΣp-consistent. ▹
In the following sections, we dropΣp in front of consistency and just write consistency short forΣp-consistency.
Lemma A.5. Γ is a set of formulas and ϕ is a formula.
1. If Γ ⊢ ϕ and Γ ⊢ ¬ϕ, then Γ is inconsistent;
2. If Γ is finitely consistent, then so is one of Γ ∪ {ϕ} and Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} for each ϕ.
3. If Γ is negation complete and finitely consistent, then it is closed under detachment.
4. Γ is maximally finitely consistent iff it is negation compete and finitely consistent.
5. Γ is maximal iff it is maximally consistent.
Proof. The detailed proof is referred to Lemma 4.13 in [27]. 
Corollary A.6. Assume that Γ is maximally consistent. Then
1. ifΣ ⊆ Γ andΣ ⊢ ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Γ ;
2. if ⊢ ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Γ .
Proof. This proposition follows directly from the above lemma. 
Corollary A.7. For any formula ϕ, ϕ is consistent if and only if¬ϕ is not a theorem ofΣs.
Proof. Assume that ϕ is consistent.
ϕ ⊬ ⊥ ⇔ ⊬ ¬ϕ. 
This corollary also tells us that, for a finite set of formulas, the definition of its Σp-consistency is the same as that of
consistency in normal modal logics or first order logic [8].
Definition A.8. A probability logic Σp is Lindenbaum if every Σp-consistent set of formulas has a maximal Σp-consistent
extension. ▹
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It is easy to the check that the consequence relation |= is Lindenbaum.
Theorem A.9. If Σ ip is a Lindenbaum probability logic for i ∈ I where I is an index set and Σ∞p =

iΣ
i
p, then Σ
∞
p is also a
Lindenbaum probability logic.
Proof. Assume that Γ is consistent in Σ∞p , i.e., (Γ ,⊥) ∉ Σ∞p . This implies that (Γ ,⊥) ∉ Σ jp for some j ∈ I . Since Σ jp is
Lindenbaum, there is a maximally Σ jp-consistent set Γ0 ⊇ Γ . But as Σ∞p ⊆ Σ jp, Γ0 is also Σ∞p -consistent. Of course, it is
negation-complete, and hence isΣ∞p -maximal. 
Definition A.10. Probability logicΣs is the least Lindenbaum probability logic. ▹
In the following, we will show that a set of formulas Γ is maximallyΣs-consistent iff it is a satisfied theory, i.e., the set of
formulas which are satisfied at some point of a Markov process or probability model. In short, we will provide a proof of the
completeness of our deductive systemΣs with respect to the class of Markov processes. In the rest of the paper, consistency
meansΣs-consistency whenever no confusion arises.
Definition A.11. The canonical Markov processMC is defined as follows:
• ΩL0 = {Γ ⊆ L0 : Γ is a maximally consistent set of formulas}.• [ϕ] = {w ∈ ΩL0 : ϕ ∈ w};• AL0 is the σ -algebra generated by {[ϕ] : ϕ ∈ L0};• The canonical measurable space is defined as ⟨ΩL0 ,AL0⟩;• define TL0(w)([ϕ]) = sup{r ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q : Lrϕ ∈ w} and we know that such a defined TL0(w) on the canonical algebra
AL0 uniquely determine the subprobability measure TL0(w) on the σ -algebraAL0 . This unique extension is guaranteed
by Theorem 2.2. ▹
Lemma A.12. For any formulas ϕ and ψ ,
• [ϕ] ⊆ [ψ] iff ⊢ ϕ → ψ ;
• [ϕ] = [ψ] iff ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ .
Proof. This lemma follows directly from the Lindenbaum property through the standard argument in modal logic [8]. 
It follows from this lemma that the above TL0 is well-defined. Note that TL0 is total. Since L1⊤ is not necessarily a theorem
in ΣS , TL0(⊤) might not be equal to 1. It remains to show that TL0(w) is a subprobability measure on AL0 . First we show
that the above defined TL0(w) is a finitely additive subprobability measure.
Lemma A.13. For A, B ∈ AL0 ,w ∈ ΩL0 , if A ∩ B = ∅, then TL0(w)(A)+ T C (w)(B) = TL0(w)(A ∪ B).
Proof. It is easy to see that there are formulas ϕ1, ϕ2 such that A = [ϕ1], B = [ϕ2] and ⊢ ϕ1 → ¬ϕ2. Let α1, α2 and α+
denote TL0(w)([ϕ1]), TL0(w)([ϕ2]) and TL0(w)([ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]), respectively. So we only need to show that α1 + α2 = α+.
Suppose that α1 + α2 < α+. Then there are ϵ1 > 0 and ϵ2 > 0 such that (α1 + ϵ1)+ (α2 + ϵ2) < α+, α1 + ϵ1 ∈ Q and
α2 + ϵ2 ∈ Q . Let α′1 := α1 + ϵ1 and α′2 := α2 + ϵ2. It follows that Lα′1ϕ1 ∉ w and hence¬Lα′1ϕ1 ∈ w. Similarly,¬Lα′2ϕ2 ∈ w.
By (A4) (actually by Lemma A.2(2) and Corollary A.6), we know that ¬Lα′1+α′2(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ∈ w. But this is impossible because
α′1 + α′2 < α+ and hence Lα′1+α′2(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ∈ w.
The following argument is dual to the above one. Suppose that α1 + α2 > α+. Then there are two ϵ1 > 0 and ϵ2 > 0
such that (α1 − ϵ1)+ (α2 − ϵ2) > α+, α1 − ϵ1 ∈ Q and α2 − ϵ2 ∈ Q . Let α′′1 := α1 − ϵ1 and α′′2 := α2 − ϵ2. It follows that
Mα′′1ϕ1 ∉ w and hence Lα′′1ϕ1 ∈ w. Similarly, Lα′′2ϕ2 ∈ w. Since ⊢ ϕ1 → ¬ϕ2, by (A3), we know that Lα′′1+α′′2 (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ∈ w.
But this is impossible because α′′1 + α′′2 > α+ and hence Lα′′1+α′′2 (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ∉ w. 
Theorem A.14. The above defined TL0(w) is a subprobability measure onAL0 .
Proof. According to Theorem 2.1, it suffices to show that if {[ϕn] : n ∈ N} is a non-increasing sequence of sets inAL0 whose
intersection is empty, i.e., [ϕ1] ⊇ [ϕ2] ⊇ · · · ⊇ [ϕn] ⊇ · · · andn[ϕn] = ∅, then limn→∞ T C (w)([ϕn]) = 0 for allw ∈ ΩL0 .
Note that finite additivity of TL0(w) implies its monotonicity. That is to say, TL0(w)([ϕ1]) ≥ TL0(w)([ϕ2]) ≥ · · · ≥
TL0(w)([ϕn]) ≥ · · · . Now we show that limn→∞ TL0(w)([ϕn]) = 0 by contradiction.
Suppose that the limit was positive, then there is a rational p such that TL0(w)([ϕn]) > p > 0 for all n. Consider the
set Γ := {ϕn : n ∈ N}. Recall thatω Γ is the set of all conjunctions of finite subsets of Γ . For any ψ ∈ ω Γ , one has
that [ψ] = [ϕm] for some m. According to the assumption, we know that T (w)([ψ]) > p, this implies that Lpψ ∈ w. This
also means that the set Lp(

ω Γ ) = {Lpψ : ψ ∈

ω Γ } ⊆ w. From A2, we know that ⊢ ¬Lp⊥ (p is positive) and hence¬Lp⊥ ∈ w. Sincew is a maximally consistent set of formulas, Lp(ω Γ ) is consistent. Therefore Lp(ω Γ ) ⊬ Lp⊥. It follows
from the rule (CAR) that Γ ⊬ ⊥. That is to say Γ is consistent.
According to the above Lindenbaum property, there is a maximally consistent setw′ of formulas such that Γ ⊆ w′ and
hence ϕn ∈ w′ for all n. Equivalently, w′ ∈ n[ϕn]. This also means thatn[ϕn] ≠ ∅, which contradicts our assumption
that

n[ϕn] = ∅.
So we conclude that limn→∞ TL0(w)([ϕn]) = 0. Theorem 2.1 guarantees that TL0(w) is also countably additive on the
σ -algebra σ(Ac0). Therefore each TL0(w) defined on the canonical model is a well-defined probability measure. 
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This theorem is the only place where we need the Countable Additivity Rule.
Corollary A.15. The above defined canonical Markov process ⟨ΩL0 ,AL0 , TL0⟩ is a Markov process.
Proof. Here we must note that Theorem 2.3 in Section 2 plays an essential role in the proof that TL0 is a transition
subprobability function. 
In Theorem 2.17, we will show that the canonical Markov process is actually on a final coalgebra.
Lemma A.16 (Truth Lemma). For anyw ∈ ΩL0 and any ϕ ∈ L0, ML0 , w |= ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ w, i.e. [[ϕ]]ML0 = [ϕ].
Proof. We prove by induction on the complexity of ϕ. Here we only deal with the non-trivial case.
Lrϕ ∈ w ⇔ r ≤ TL0(w)([ϕ])
⇔ ML0 , w |= Lrϕ
We use the rule (ARCH) in the proof of the right-to-left direction of the first equivalence. The last step is based on the
induction hypothesis that [ϕ] = [[ϕ]]ML0 . 
Proof of Theorem 2.16. It suffices to show that any Σs-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable in a probability model. But
this follows immediately from the Lindenbaum property and the Truth Lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 2.17. We prove that d satisfies the three conditions in the definition of zigzag morphism.
1. First we show that, for each [ϕ] ∈ A0L0 , d−1([ϕ]) = [[ϕ]]M ∈ A.
w ∈ d−1([ϕ]) ⇔ d(w) ∈ [ϕ]
⇔ ϕ ∈ d(w)
⇔ M, w |= ϕ
⇔ w ∈ [[ϕ]]M .
2. For anyw ∈ Ω, [ϕ] ∈ A0L0 ,
TL0(d(w))([ϕ]) = (1)
sup{r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] : Lrϕ ∈ d(w)}
= (2)
sup{r ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] : M, w |= Lrϕ}
= T (w)([[ϕ]]M)
= T (w)(d−1([ϕ]))
The last equality came from the first part.
Indeed d is a zigzag morphism fromM toML0 . The uniqueness follows from Lemma 2.13. So indeedML0 is final in the class
of Markov processes. 
Appendix B. Isomorphism between final coalgebras
In this section, the terminology is from [36] and we fix the functor T := ∆(Id + 1), which is a measurable polynomial
functor.
B.1. Syntax and semantics
Ing(∆(Id+ 1)) = {Id, Id+ 1, 1,∆(Id+ 1)}. We define a languageL(T ) as follows: for any S ∈ Ing(T )
trueS : S ∅ : 1 {1} : 1
ϕ : S, ψ : S
ϕ ∧ ψ : S
ϕ : Id
inlId+1ϕ : Id+ 1
ψ : 1
inrId+1ψ : Id+ 1
ϕ : Id+ 1, p ∈ [0, 1]
βpϕ : ∆(Id+ 1)
ϕ : ∆(Id+ 1)
[next]ϕ : Id
Let c : X → TX be a coalgebra of T . The semantics ofL(T ) is defined as follows:
[[true]]cS = SX [[∅]]c1 = ∅ [[{1}]]c1 = {1}
[[ϕ ∧ ψ]]cS = [[ϕ]]cS ∩ [[ψ]]cS [[inlϕ]]cId+1 = inl([[ϕ]]cId) [[inrϕ]]cId+1 = inr([[ϕ]]c1)
[[βpϕ]]c∆(Id+1) = βp([[ϕ]]cId+1) [[[next]ϕ]]cId = c−1([[ϕ]]cT )
where βp([[ϕ]]cId+1) = {µ ∈ ∆(Id+ 1) : µ([[ϕ]]cId+1) ≥ p}.
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B.2. Final coalgebra for∆(Id+ 1)
Definition B.17. For each coalgebra c : x → TX and each x ∈ SX where S ∈ Ing(T ), we define
dcS(x) := {ϕ : S|x ∈ [[ϕ]]cS}.
Each such set dcS(x) is called a satisfied theory. ▹
Definition B.18. We define the canonical sets S∗ for S ∈ Ing(T ) by
S∗ = {dcS(x) : x ∈ SX for some coalgebra c : X → TX}. ▹
So Id∗ is the ‘‘maximally consistent set’’ of formulas [next]ϕ : Id or trueId : Id. The following two propositions are from
Lemma 5.1 and Theorem 6.4 in [36].
Lemma B.19. There is a family of measurable maps rS : S∗ → S(Id∗) indexed by the ingredients of T such that, for all coalgebras
c : X → TX, the diagram below commutes:
SX
S∗ S(Id∗)
✻
dcS
✲
rS
 
 
 
 
 
 ✒
SdcId
Theorem B.20. Let c∗ : Id∗ → T (Id∗) be
rT ◦ [next]−1 : Id∗ → T ∗ → T (Id∗)
c∗ := rT ◦ [next]−1 is the final coalgebra for T .
B.3. Translation
In this section we define an inter-translation between formulas with and without sort Id. From the syntax of L(T ) we
know that
• each formula of sort Id is trueId or is of the formi[next]ϕi where• each ϕi is of the formi βpiψi (here true∆Id is taken to be β1(trueId)) where• each ψi is of the formk inlId+1θk or of the formk inrId+1θk where• each θk is of the sort Id.
So each formula of sort Id is of the following form
trueId ∧

i∈I
[next]

j∈Ji
βpiψj

where ψj is of the form (

k∈Kj inlId+1θk) ∧ (

k′∈K ′j inrId+1θk′). We stipulate that if I = ∅ or J = ∅, then the conjunction is
equivalent to trueId.
Recall that the simple probabilistic modal logicL0 is defined as follows:
ϕ := ⊤ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Lpϕ.
Definition B.21. Let c : X → T (X) be a coalgebra for T where X = ⟨X,A⟩ is a measurable space. The satisfaction relation
on X ×L0 is defined inductively as follows:
• (X, c), x |= ⊤ for all x ∈ X;
• (X, c), x |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff (X, c), x |= ϕ1 and (X, c), x |= ϕ2;• (X, c), x |= Lpϕ iff c(x)(inl([[ϕ]]c)) ≥ pwhere [[ϕ]]c = {x ∈ X : (X, c), x |= ϕ}.
dc(x) is the set of formulas inL0 that are satisfied at x in (X, c) and is called the satisfied theory of formulas at x. ▹
For each x ∈ X and A ∈ A, define T (x, A) := c(x)(inl(A)). It is easy to see that such defined T is a transition subprobability
function and ⟨X,A, T ⟩ is a Markov process.
Definition B.22. A translation from ◦ : L(T )→ L0 is defined inductively as follows:
• (trueId : Id)◦ = ⊤;• (ϕ ∧ ψ : Id)◦ = (ϕ)◦ ∧ (ϕ)◦;
• If ψj is of the form (k∈Kj inlId+1θk) ∧ (k′∈K ′j inrId+1θk′), then ([next](j∈J βpiψj) : Id)◦ =j∈J Lpi((k∈Kj θ◦k ). ▹
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The third clause in the translation is themost important one. The intuition behind this clause is formalized in the following
proposition. For a set of formulas Γ ⊆ L(T ) of sort Id, Γ ◦ := {ϕ◦ : ϕ ∈ Γ }(⊆ L0). We can easily prove by induction the
following proposition.
Theorem B.23. Let c : X → T (X) be a coalgebra. For any formula ϕ : Id inL(T ),
[[ϕ]]cId = [[ϕ◦]]c
Corollary B.24. Let c : X → T (X) be a coalgebra. The above two description maps dcId and dc are equivalent in the sense that,
for all x ∈ X,
(dcId(x))
◦ = dc(x).
Goldblatt [27] provided a deduction system ⊢L(T ) for L(T ) and in Section 2 we adapted it to be a complete deductive
system ⊢L0 forL0. This theorem follows from Theorem 5.17 in [27].
Theorem B.25. Let Γ be a set of formulas inL(T ) of sort Id. Γ is maximal⊢L(T )-consistent iff it is dcId(x) for some state x in some
coalgebra c : X → T (X).
B.4. Isomorphism between final coalgebras of∆(Id+ 1)
Recall that Id∗ is the set of all satisfied theories of formulas of sort Id and is equipped with the σ -algebra AID that is
generated by the sets |ϕ|Id where |ϕ|Id := {Γ ∈ Id∗ : ϕ ∈ Γ }. (Id∗)◦ = {(dcId(x))◦ : x is a state in some coalgebra c : X →
∆(X)}. The proposition below follows directly from Theorem B.23.
Corollary B.26. (Id∗)◦ is the class of allmaximally⊢L0-consistent sets of formulas inL0. The translation ◦ is one-to-one on Id∗ in
the sense that, if dcId(x) ≠ dc′Id(x′) for states x in c : X → T (X) and x′ in c ′ : X ′ → T (X ′), then (dcId(x))◦ ≠ (dc′Id(x′))◦, namely, dc(x)
≠ dc′(x′) .
First recall some notions from Appendix A. ΩL0 is the class of all maximally ⊢L0-consistent sets of formulas in L0. So
it is the same as (Id∗)◦. We equip ΩL0 with the σ -algebra AL0 generated by the sets |ϕ| := {Γ ∈ ΩL0 : ϕ ∈ Γ }, i.e.,
maximally ⊢L0-consistent sets of formulas in L0. Note that, for a formula ϕ : Id in L(T ), (|ϕ|Id)◦ = |ϕ◦|. For any s ∈ ΩL0
and |ϕ| ⊆ ΩL0 , define
TL0(s)(|ϕ|) = {p ∈ [0, 1] : Lpϕ ∈ s}.
Wehave shown in Appendix A that TL0(s) is a finitely additivemeasure on the set of |ϕ|’s and it can be uniquely extended
to a measure onAL0 . We equip∆(ΩL0)with the σ -algebraAL0 generated by the following sets
βp(|ϕ|) := {µ ∈ ∆(ΩL0) : µ(|ϕ|) ≥ p}.
Define cL0 to be a function fromΩL0 to T (ΩL0) satisfying the condition cL0(s)(inl(|ϕ|)) = TL0(s)(|ϕ|). It is easy to see that
such defined cL0 : ΩL0 → T (ΩL0) isAL0-measurable and hence is a coalgebra for T .
Lemma B.27. Let c : X → T (X). For each formula ϕ ∈ L0,
c(x)(inl([[ϕ]]c)) = cL0(dc(x))(inl(|ϕ|)).
Proof. Both sides are equal to sup{p : (X, c), x |= Lpϕ}. The proof of this lemma is essentially similar to that of Theo-
rem 2.17. 
Theorem B.28 (Main Theorem). The following diagram commutes:
ΩL
Id∗ T ∗ T (Id∗)
T (ΩL0)
❄
◦
✲
[next]−1
✲
rT
❄✲cL0
∆·◦
That is to say, ◦ : Id∗ → ΩL0 is a coalgebra homomorphism. Moreover, the inverse of the translation ◦ is also coalgebra
homomorphism. So, the following two coalgebras are isomorphic:
• c∗ : Id∗ → T (Id∗);
• cL0 : ΩL0 → T (ΩL0).
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Proof. Let c : X → T (X) be a coalgebra. cId+1 : X → X + 1 is defined by cId+1(x) = inl(x). It is easy to see that there is a
unique measurable function c∆ : X + 1→ ∆(X + 1)(= T (X)) such that c = c∆cId+1.
Given a formula ψ ∈ L0, there is a formula ϕ : Id in L(T ) such that ϕ◦ = ψ . Note that (|ϕ|Id)◦ = |ϕ◦|. Moreover, from
Theorem B.23, we know that the inverse image of |ϕ◦| under (_◦)−1 is |ϕ|Id. It suffices to show the following equality:
c∗(dcId(x))(inl(|ϕ|Id)) = cL0((dcId(x))◦)(inl(|ϕ◦|))
We reason as follows:
c∗(dcId(x))(inl(|ϕ|Id)) = rT ◦ [next]−1(dcId(x))(inl(|ϕ|Id)) (Theorem B.20)
= rT (dcT (c(x)))(inl(|ϕ|Id)) (Lemma 4.12 in [36])
= (TdcId)(c(x))(inl(|ϕ|Id)) (Lemma B.19)
= (∆(Id+ 1)dcId)(c∆cId+1(x))(inl(|ϕ|Id))
= c∆(cId+1(x))((Id+ 1)dcId)−1(inl(|ϕ|Id))) (Definition of∆)
= c(x)(inl([[ϕ]]cId))
= c(x)(inl([[ϕ◦]]c)) (Theorem B.23)
= cL0(dc(x))(inl(|ϕ◦|)) (Theorem B.27). 
So the final coalgebra for the functor ∆(Id + 1) using formulas in L0 as in Section 2 is isomorphic to the one for the
functor∆(Id+ 1) from [36].
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